

1 Territoriality and conflict in an era of globalization

Miles Kahler

The world of the early twenty-first century displays both persistent attachments to territory and violent conflict over those territorial stakes. Even as interstate conflict has declined, many costly internal conflicts have taken on a territorial dimension. The persistence of territoriality and the conflict that it inspires run counter to one popular view of the consequences of growing globalization: capital, goods, and populations display increased mobility, and their detachment from territory should reduce the importance of conventional territorial boundaries. Globalization has produced changes in territoriality and the functions of borders, but it has eliminated neither. We do not live in a “borderless world” or one that has seen the “end of geography” (Omae 1990; O’Brien 1992). Conflict over territory continues in an increasingly integrated world.

Spanning the social sciences, the authors in this volume present converging investigations into the complex causal relations among territoriality, conflict, and globalization. The study of globalization and the persistence of ethnic conflict have stimulated an interest in borders of all kinds, questioning their permanence and defining the consequences when social and cultural identities do not coincide with political boundaries and territorial claims.¹ The contributors display skepticism toward both an unreconstructed view of the sovereign territorial state and the competing claim that globalization has completely transformed the existing territorial regime. The modern territorial state is seen as one historically bounded exemplar of territoriality, rather than the defining expression of territorial rule. Scrutiny of the concept of territoriality leads to a more contingent and mutable formulation of unit variation rather than the conventional, static view of territoriality within international relations – a “Westphalian” system populated by precisely delimited, territorial states (Kahler 2002).

At the same time, changing territoriality is not equated with deterritorialization in an era of globalization. Early arguments claimed that globalization – particularly global economic integration – was eroding or “hollowing out” the role of the nation-state as governance moved to

2 *Miles Kahler*

global and regional international institutions and devolved to sub-national units. In addition, private actors seemed to claim a role in governance that would substitute for, rather than complement, the role of national governments. Subsequent investigation has revealed a modern nation-state that is far from obsolete or absent from national governance. No universal shift in the location of governance has taken place. Rather, national governments, which have remained bounded territorial units, have adapted in order to retain the effectiveness and accountability demanded by their constituents. New forms of governance have emerged in the face of competing demands from the forces of integration and the claims of constituents (Kahler and Lake 2003).

Territoriality as the creation of actors over time, globalization as one of the determinants of territoriality rather than a force for its eradication – these broad viewpoints inform all of the chapters that follow. Disagreement over which actors are most important and how constrained their actions may be will become apparent. To question territoriality and the consequences of globalization would not set this study apart from many others, however. In three ways, however, it also advances the exploration of territoriality, globalization, and conflict:

- 1 Although states (and groups) continue to contest territory, often violently, the reasons for particular *territorial attachments* have remained obscure. Explanations are advanced, here and elsewhere, for a general increase in the importance of territorial stakes, but even in eras when territory appears of declining importance, specific territorial attachments can be mobilized into politics in ways that reinforce conflict. Globalization has in some cases strengthened those attachments and in others diluted them. In the first part of this volume, several models are advanced for the construction and persistence of such attachments. They provide alternative micro-foundations for changes in territoriality.
- 2 Although major interstate conflict has declined in recent decades, territorial conflicts remain prone to escalation and difficult to resolve. Conflicts within the borders of states often display a territorial dimension that has similar effects on their deadliness and persistence. Territoriality defined as *territorial stakes* clearly influences conflicts; globalization affects those stakes and may predictably increase or diminish the likelihood of conflict between and within states. The effects of globalization may also have different effects on interstate conflicts and those erupting within the borders of existing states. Explaining the effects of globalization on territorial stakes and, through those stakes, on violent conflict is a central aim of authors in the second part.

3 Finally, the micropolitics of territorial attachments and territorial stakes contribute to the construction of *territorial regimes* – territoriality defined as domestic and international institutions. Boundaries are often seen as sources of dispute and symbols of conflict, barriers to movement and frontiers for military defense. As institutions that legitimate territorial claims, however, settled borders also play a central role in conflict reduction. Policy jurisdictions may match territorial borders, or they may bear only a rough relationship to a territorially defined space. Globalization and conflict both influence the regime of borders and jurisdictions and its changes over time. An exploration of territorial regimes and their determinants lies at the center of part III.

Controversies surrounding the changing nature of globalization, territoriality, and violent conflict have centered on their definition and their consequences. Each has inspired a rich scholarly and policy literature over the past decade. Causal links among the three have been posited, but their investigation is far from complete. The volume at hand draws on interdisciplinary investigation of these features of the global system in order to better define them, to explore their change over time, and to propose causal relationships among them.² Changes in territoriality lie at the core of this research agenda, changes shaped by both globalization and past conflict that in turn increase the probability either of continuing conflict or of its resolution.

Territoriality and globalization defined

Territoriality

For anthropologists and geographers, who view territoriality over long historical spans and across cultural divides, territoriality has two dimensions: delimitation of boundaries and behavior within those boundaries. Robert Sack, for example, defines territoriality as “the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area” (1986, 19). Each of these dimensions has demonstrated wide variation over time and across societies.

In modern political science, sociology, and international relations, territoriality has been defined more narrowly in terms of spatially defined political rule. Recent explorations of territoriality have questioned the axiomatic hold that the modern state has had in defining territorial rule, however. This new look at unit variation has unearthed the territorial

and non-territorial rivals of the modern territorial state and emphasizes the contingent nature of the eventual success and expansion of this particular territorial template.³ Hendrik Spruyt and Charles Tilly, for example, emphasize the importance of city-leagues and city-states in late medieval Europe, rivals to the territorial state that enjoyed considerable success before falling to its greater military power and institutional advantages (Tilly 1990; Spruyt 1994). Andreas Osiander (2001) has challenged the claim of a sharp Westphalian break that separates the modern state system from earlier conceptions of sovereignty and territoriality.

Even this narrower definition contains three dimensions of variation. First, individuals and groups can be distinguished by their *territorial attachment and detachment*: their identification with a particular territory and the precision and intensity of that identification. As Terrence Lyons describes, certain groups of migrants, particularly economic migrants, demonstrate little identification with their previous homeland. Diasporic communities, however, display a close affinity with a homeland that may often be more mythical than real, but one that has significant behavioral implications nonetheless (Lyons, this volume).

Territorial attachment is in turn a major determinant of the *stakes* that actors, particularly political elites, discern in territory. For those pre-occupied with the role of territorial claims in violent conflict among or within units, this second dimension of territoriality is central: territory may be more or less important (as compared to other objectives) as a stake in bargaining among key actors. Over time, governments and groups have awarded greater or lesser value to land in their disputes.

Conflicting territorial claims may involve stakes of two types. Tangible territorial stakes include varying degrees of control over land and sea, as well as over the resources and populations that are part of those spatial claims. More puzzling and difficult to explain, however, are the symbolic stakes that are often invested in territorial conflicts. At the level of the polity, these stakes are often determined by the prior (and constructed) territorial attachments of groups. As a result, territories that are devoid of resources or substantial, ethnically related populations may still become the site of violent disputes. Unraveling the sources of territorial attachment will help to explain the symbolic stakes that lie at the heart of many territorial conflicts.

Finally, challenges to a timeless Westphalian order that are based on an awareness of the fluidity of territoriality require the introduction of *territorial regime* as a third dimension of changes in territoriality. Territorial regime narrows the concept of territoriality by reducing both the actors and the behaviors of interest. A territorial regime governs the

spatial exercise of authority by political elites or governments. As defined earlier, such a regime is constituted by the norms, institutions, and practices associated with territorial governance. Its two principal constituents are *border delimitation* and *jurisdictional congruence*. Border delimitation captures the means by which political units separate themselves from other units, means that can be characterized by more or less precision and permanence. Jurisdictional congruence measures the degree to which exclusive political authority across policy domains coincides with those boundaries.

These dimensions of territorial regimes have displayed considerable variation over time. For example, Friedrich Kratochwil (1986) contrasts border delimitation practices and jurisdictional authority among pastoral or nomadic peoples with the institutions of ancient empires and the contemporary states system. The introduction of fixed property among the Mongols – a different and more permanent sort of control over territory – led to a decline in their mobility, which had been a major strategic asset deployed against the Chinese empire, and to the institution of new and more permanent hierarchical relations with their sedentary neighbors (Kratochwil 1986, 21). Michael Saltman (2002) has described a similar transition among the Kipsigi, a formerly pastoral people in Kenya. The dimensions of territoriality have also differed across regions as well as among different types of units. Amitav Acharya describes the pre-colonial interstate system in Southeast Asia as “loosely organised states existing side-by-side without clearly defined territorial limits” (Acharya 2000, 21).⁴ In pre-colonial Africa, an abundance of land coupled with relatively low population meant that authority faded rapidly from the center to the ill-defined edges of the polity (Herbst 2000). The Westphalian image of precisely delimited borders and exclusive, congruent jurisdictions within those borders has been an exception rather than a norm even within western Europe, as Peter Sahlins (1989) demonstrates in the case of the Pyrenees border between France and Spain. Although this border was one of the first to be agreed in early modern Europe, it was initially defined in jurisdictional terms – the rule of the two sovereigns over particular subjects – rather than as strictly territorial rule. Those jurisdictions continued to overlap for some time.

Globalization

Globalization is a term laden with political freight and theoretical ambiguity. For some, globalization encompasses a host of changes in international politics that can be traced to radically reduced costs of

international transportation and communications. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, for example, define globalization as an increase in globalism, which is described as “networks of interdependence at multi-continental distances” (Keohane and Nye 2000, 2). Defined in such a way, globalization becomes so all-encompassing that its usefulness for explanation is reduced. Given its scope, endogeneity seems to be defined into the concept, and tracing the direction of causality becomes very difficult.

For the purposes of exploring its consequences for territoriality and military conflict, globalization will be more narrowly defined as economic integration at the global level, a reduction in the barriers to economic exchange and factor mobility that creates one economic space from many.⁵ Economic globalization, which is central to most contemporary debates about globalization’s reach and its consequences, is driven by both the technological changes noted above and the political choices of governments. Although measured through economic indices, it is not a purely technological or economic process. Trade-based measures are often deployed to estimate levels of globalization, but a definition of economic globalization should include investment and migration as well. Contemporary economic integration is driven by capital market integration and foreign direct investment by multinational corporations as much as by the opening of markets to trade in goods and services. Cross-border migration may also have important political implications, as the diasporas described by Terrence Lyons demonstrate. Finally, globalization, even when defined as economic integration, may vary over time. The pre-1914 era of globalization, despite high levels of economic integration, differed from contemporary globalization in both economic constituents and territorial outcomes.⁶ That variation is noted by several of the authors when assessing the significance of globalization for changes in territoriality.

Explaining territorial attachments

Territorial attachments are often identified as contributors to conflict within and between states. Systematic analysis of interstate territorial conflict points to the importance of symbolic attachments to territory: the intrinsic value of territory (in terms of its economic or demographic significance) cannot account for a substantial share of disputes and violent conflict over territory (Diehl 1999a, x–xi). Domestic political dynamics drive territorial conflict as much as the strategic value of the territory in dispute, and those political dynamics are often rooted in the

symbolism of territory rather than its measurable value (Huth 1999, 68; Hensel 1999, 117–19).

The lack of coincidence between homeland attachments and countries of residence also lies at the heart of many ethnonational disputes *within* existing states, disputes that may also have a strong international dimension. Homelands may match perfectly the boundaries that delimit a particular state, but that outcome is relatively rare. The homeland may be external to the state of residence of an individual or group (as in the case of diasporas). It may also be only a portion of an existing state, as in the case of many secessionist movements. Or, as in irredentist movements, a homeland may span the territory of more than one state. In any of these cases, homeland selection may point toward conflict between states or between groups and their states of residence (Barrington et al. 2003, 292–94). In conflicts between governments and ethnonational groups, Monica Toft (2003) has discovered that populations concentrated territorially and lacking any other homeland are more likely to turn to violence to achieve their ends in the face of state resistance to greater autonomy.

Given the underlying importance of territorial attachments in many conflicts and growing evidence that the homeland “is a perception, susceptible to change over time” (Toft 2003, 313), a model that explains the creation, maintenance, and demise of territorial attachments would also contribute to an explanation for many territorial conflicts. Four such models are presented in the first part of this volume. Hein Goemans argues that the homeland originates in the classical setting of insecurity familiar to students of international politics. The need for collective defense offers powerful incentives for a clear principle that will allow identification of membership in the group. Territoriality has often provided that core principle, offering advantages of coordination both to followers – who can more easily monitor their leader(s) – and to the elite who can more reliably count on the support of the population in common defense (Goemans, this volume).

As Goemans describes, these rationalist assumptions help to explain the emergence and survival of a group norm for defense of the homeland, but the choice of a *particular* homeland requires further explanation through a set of focal principles that are deployed to identify the contours of the homeland, focal principles that change over time. Peter Sahlins (1989), for example, describes how the focal principle of “natural” frontiers, defined by mountain ranges or rivers, became more accepted in the boundary delimitation of early modern Europe, often displacing historical (and mythical) claims. Although these focal

principles often appeared to disguise simple strategic interests, they also took on a life of their own in the professional work of geographers, cartographers, and diplomats. In his account of colonial boundary surveys in British Guiana, D. Graham Burnett describes the ways in which different focal principles could conflict: finding a boundary that referred to historical occupation, followed natural features of the landscape, offered visibility, and allowed access to surveyors fixing its position was often impossible. The selection of one focal principle rather than another could produce persistent border disputes, such as those that Guyana inherited from its colonial ruler (Burnett 2000, 209–10).

Joel Robbins (chapter 3) presents a case of territorial detachment in his account of the Urapmin of Papua New Guinea, a group who, under the influence of cultural (religious) and economic globalization, reject their existing territorial domain in favor of alternative identities. The homeland in this case is not a reservoir of positive emotional attachment, but a persistent barrier to religious and economic aspirations. Robbins recreates at the local level a parallel to the territorial reconstitution traced by others at the national and international levels. Two competing versions of globalization's effects on such local territorial attachments emerge: on the one hand, globalization may provoke an identity backlash that deepens symbolic territorial attachments at the local level; on the other, globalization, in this case defined more broadly than economic globalization, may provide a menu of new identities, competitors that undermine or usurp older symbolic attachments to territory. The Urapmin were hardly participants in the global economy; as Robbins points out, globalization was more an aspiration than a reality. Territorial detachment owed more to an imported transnational religious identity, Pentecostal Christianity, which provided a symbolic alternative to deities rooted in their locale. Religion in this case eroded attachment to a local homeland, in striking contrast to the "geopieté" described by David Newman in Israel.

Newman (chapter 4) traces reterritorialization and the development of territorial attachments at the local level. Like other authors in this volume, he rejects a simple trajectory from globalization to a borderless world, particularly when invisible borders are constructed every day at the local level. For many ethnoterritorial conflicts, the creation of territorial facts on the (local) ground has been a central instrument in creating new landscapes and new territorial realities. As Newman argues, borders as dynamic institutions incorporate "a 'bottom up' process of change, . . . which emanates from the daily functional patterns of the ordinary people living in the borderland region, as much as the

traditional 'top down' approach which focuses solely on the role of institutional actors, notably – but not only – governments" (Newman, this volume).

Territorial expressions of conflict, through such processes as residential segregation and differential distribution of resources, are part of the micro-level means for reshaping territory that may later be reflected at the more familiar level of national borders and conflicts. As Peter Sahlins (1989) describes in the case of neighboring Catalan villages that faced each other across the French–Spanish border, local politics could embroil national governments and call on national claims to promote local ends, just as national governments could at times mobilize local populations in their own strategies on the frontier. At the Finnish–Soviet border, Anssi Paasi contrasts the attitudes of national elites toward the border – a stance of fear and "otherness" – with the younger generations who live near the border and have been "completely socialized" to its existence. For them, the border is "part of the routine of everyday activities and part of the security that springs from the routinization of action" (1996, 268–69). The potential conflict between local territorial compartmentalization or compromise and national strategies may also undermine efforts at conflict resolution.

A final set of actors may be strengthened by globalization and in turn reinforce the high symbolic stakes and politically significant attachments associated with territory: diasporas. Although diaspora is a contested concept, attachment to a homeland outside the state of residence is a key factor separating diasporic communities from other migrants: "the old country" – a notion often buried deep in language, religion, custom or folklore – always has some claim on their loyalty and emotions."⁷ That homeland is defined territorially, often more precisely and emotionally by diasporas than by homeland residents themselves. Terrence Lyons (chapter 5) examines those attachments and their determinants in the case of conflict-generated diaspora groups. He also traces the attitudes of diasporas toward territorial politics in the homeland. Diasporas may provide an important external constituency with intense preferences regarding territorial conflict, one with resources to back up their political attitudes. Diasporas also share a particular relationship to globalization. Although the conflict-generated diasporas described by Lyons were not created by globalization, contemporary globalization has provided both avenues for retaining intensive communication with the former homeland and, occasionally, the economic incentives to maintain those links. Paradoxically, globalization allows diasporic communities to reinforce starkly territorial definitions of the homeland and to heighten the territorial stakes in both internal and interstate conflicts.

Territorial stakes, globalization, and conflict

Territory remains a potent source of conflict between states, one that has persisted into the current era of globalization. Even if proximity is controlled, territorial stakes remain important in many militarized disputes and wars. Territorial disputes are more likely to escalate: militarized disputes over territory are much more likely to involve a militarized response by the target state and are more likely to escalate to full-scale war. Territorial conflicts – both interstate and intrastate – are more likely to be protracted and difficult to settle. The tangible stakes associated with territorial disputes (strategic location, economic value, and shared ethnic groups) clearly explain some of the active territorial claims between states, but far from all.⁸

For conflicts internal to states as well as those between states, the ability to mobilize political support over a territorial conflict derives from the salience of such conflicts, which, in turn, is often based on symbolic attachments and appeals. Such mobilization often makes territory – an eminently divisible stake – an intractable issue by creating effective indivisibility.⁹ Goemans, for example, argues that attachment to a particular focal principle in defining the homeland may produce bargaining failures. If territorial concession calls into question the underlying focal principle that defines the territory that should be defended, the intrinsic value of territory could fail to predict its perceived implications for group survival.

The direct effect of globalization on violent conflict has most often been investigated through dyadic measures of economic interdependence. Most research points to a positive relationship between interdependence and peace, although skeptical voices remain.¹⁰ Here the principal concern is globalization's effects on territoriality – defined as the territorial regime or the salience of territorial stakes – and whether those changes in territoriality have discernable effects on territorial disputes and the militarized conflicts that may follow from them. If globalization, through either changes in territorial regimes or a reduction in intrinsic or symbolic territorial stakes, lowers the frequency of territorial disputes between states or groups, its contribution to a reduction in violent conflict could be substantial. Such effects could also be used to reshape strategies for the resolution of such disputes.

David Lake and Angela O'Mahony (chapter 6) connect changing territorial stakes and interstate conflict through the variable of changing state size. State size in the international system demonstrates a clear and significant pattern of increase in the nineteenth century and decrease in the twentieth century. For Lake and O'Mahony, increasing state size is

accompanied by an increase in the importance of territorial stakes for state elites and a greater propensity for conflict over territorial issues. A simple increase in conflict over territory, however, need not lead directly to an increase in militarized disputes or wars fought over territory. Following the rationalist theory of war, Lake and O'Mahony point out that many such disputes could be resolved peacefully in the absence of failures of bargaining, such as information asymmetries, inability to commit credibly, or barriers to divisibility.

Lake and O'Mahony make a critical link between changing territorial stakes and the likelihood of war by demonstrating that an increase in the value of territory produces a result equivalent to a reduction in the *relative* cost of waging war under a familiar rationalist model. An increase in state size, which implies increasing territorial stakes, should therefore produce a greater probability of interstate conflict. This expectation seems to be confirmed by a cycle of rising and declining interstate territorial conflict that tracks the rise and decline of state size. Their findings are confirmed by others. As measured by Kalevi J. Holsti, territory declined as a percentage of issues in interstate war in the nineteenth century (1815–1914) as compared to the previous century (1715–1814), but only because other issues – ideological and national – emerged during the period. As Holsti notes, “territory continued to be the main indicator of a nation’s power, as it had been since the days of Louis XIV” (1991, 151). Using a somewhat different periodization, Paul Hensel discovers that territory has remained a relatively constant source of militarized disputes, although the 1920–39 period (decades of low global economic integration) witnessed the highest percentage of territorial issues in such disputes (Hensel 2002, 40).

The influence of globalization on the dynamics of state size and interstate conflict is ambiguous, however. Lake and O'Mahony detect different effects over time, in particular during the pre-1914 and post-1945 eras of advancing global economic integration. One familiar model, that of Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore (2003, chap. 6), predicts that increasing global economic integration should favor the creation of smaller states. In the late nineteenth century, however, state size increased: the predicted effects of globalization were either more than offset by technological changes that permitted states to project power over larger areas or average state size would have grown even larger in the absence of globalization. In the most recent period of globalization, on the other hand, trends toward economic openness and larger numbers of unitary democracies have reinforced one another and the century-long pattern of smaller states (Lake and O'Mahony, this volume). Kal Raustiala, in his investigation of the territorial characteristics

of the US domestic legal regime (chapter 9), also questions whether the effects of globalization are consistent across historical periods. Foreign direct investment and intra-industry trade have been more characteristic of global economic integration in recent decades, creating incentives for assertions of extraterritorial regulatory jurisdiction. Globalization only had this effect, however, because of a prior expansion of the regulatory reach of the state domestically. Other international changes – in the security environment and in relative power – have had more influence on the evolution of US legal territoriality.

In teasing apart the distinct effects of economic development and globalization on violent interstate conflict, Erik Gartzke's results (chapter 7) also qualify the effects of globalization on territorial stakes and territorial conflict. Economic development has contradictory implications for conflict: on the one hand, enhancing capabilities and creating a larger pool of potential disputants and, on the other, reducing the significance of territorial stakes. Overall, the propensity of more economically developed states to engage in territorial disputes declines, but non-territorial conflict actually increases with development. Even this outcome reduces conflict over territorial stakes, a particularly dangerous form of interstate conflict.

To the degree that globalization spurs economic development, it will also contribute to this reduction in conflict over territorial stakes. If globalization spurs industrialization, the value of land as a factor of production (and incentives to conquest) will decline as well, reducing the incentives for territorial acquisition (Zacher 2001). Globalization also disperses industrial production and integrates it in far-flung networks. Territorial acquisition is therefore unlikely to produce control over significant economic sectors or technologies. Stephen Brooks (1999) argues that the central role of foreign direct investment in contemporary globalization may allow governments to substitute that instrument of external economic influence for the older instrument of conquest. Each of these economic changes is associated with contemporary globalization (but not to the same degree with pre-1914 globalization); each also reduces the incentives for territorial acquisition.

Gartzke, however, argues that the empirical evidence demonstrates little independent effect of globalization on territorial conflict. As demonstrated in other spheres, globalization does not appear to have a strong "deterritorializing" effect on warfare. Globalization does reduce interstate disputes overall, but it demonstrates, according to Gartzke, no differential effect on territorial conflicts. He suggests that the dyadic effects of globalization – the constraint that economic interdependence

exercises on conflict and the enhancement of signaling abilities – are too weak to overcome the dynamics of territorial conflict, “conflicts of an intensity where integration is neither an effective deterrent, nor a particularly useful signal of resolve.”¹¹

Halvard Buhaug and Nils Petter Gleditsch (chapter 8) provide a third skeptical view of the influence that globalization exerts on territorial conflict. Rather than emphasizing territorial stakes, however, they concentrate on state capabilities and the effects that technological changes associated with globalization may have on patterns of conflict. In parallel with other authors in the volume, they criticize a simple association of globalization with the “death of distance.” Predictions that conflict will become less associated with regional neighborhoods and with geographically proximate adversaries are challenged. The technological changes that have reduced the cost of many long-distance economic transactions have not spilled over completely into military technology, which remains more constrained by geography. Like Gartzke, they find only a weak relationship between globalization and the decline of territorial conflicts, lending further support to others in this volume who reject an overarching deterritorialization as a necessary consequence of globalization.¹²

Territorial conflicts between states remain a significant and dangerous part of interstate violence, but the incidence of such conflicts has declined since the nineteenth century. Globalization appears to have played a relatively minor role in that decline. As Lake and O’Mahony point out, the pre-1914 era of globalization witnessed both increasing state size and an increase in violent territorial conflict. Kal Raustiala’s reading of the territorial logic of legal regimes at the time confirms this relationship: globalization and traditional Westphalian territoriality were at least able to cohabit during that era. Gartzke undermines the independent role of globalization by examining economic development and its effects on territorial conflict. Rich countries have greater capabilities, which result in involvement in more conflict, but those conflicts do appear to revolve around non-territorial stakes. Globalization, however, seems to have at best a weak effect on the incidence of conflict over territorial stakes.

The effects of globalization on interstate conflict do not demonstrate a radical undermining of territoriality. Its effects on conflict within states may be more pronounced and could exacerbate such conflicts. Internal conflicts represent the largest share of violent conflicts in recent decades, and a large number of internal conflicts have territorial stakes.¹³ Wars within states have also proven resistant to settlement in recent decades, producing a cumulation of ongoing civil wars since 1945.¹⁴

Existing models of violent conflict within states suggest plausible causal connections between globalization and this pattern. The insurgency model of James Fearon and David Laitin provides one such link (2003, 77). The core of their model involves a contest between an ineffectual and arbitrary central government and a rural insurgency based in inhospitable terrain and drawing on a large population. Territoriality and globalization figure in their results through the effects of the territorial regime. First, the international territorial regime has sustained “quasi-states” with weak administrative capability, “badly financed, organizationally inept, corrupt, politically divided, and poorly informed about goings-on at the local level” (ibid., 80). Government weakness permits insurgencies to persist.

A second feature of the territorial regime, internal administrative boundaries, is rarely functional in the settlement of internal territorial conflict. For one important group of insurgencies, labeled “sons of the soil” by Fearon (2004), conflicts over land or natural resources are intensified by in-migration to the peripheral area by a more populous (and land-hungry) dominant group, often supported by the central government. These conflicts, particularly important in Asia, also tend to be among the most protracted. Although boundary regimes are increasingly clear at the international level and borders can serve as institutional supports for conflict resolution, few if any such territorial conventions exist within states. As Goemans describes, pre-existing administrative boundaries have often provided a relatively peaceful focal point for state disintegration (most notably in the former Soviet Union), but that convention is only triggered by prospective state failure.¹⁵ Perversely, a clear-cut territorial regime *between* states and the absence of such a regime *within* states may offer strong incentives for armed resistance and secession. If globalization also provides economic incentives for smaller territorial scale, the case for a violent attempt at separation may appear even more attractive.

A second link between globalization and internal conflict lies in the resources that support such insurgencies. Both the insurgency model of Fearon and Laitin (2003) and the “greed and grievance” model of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2000) point to tradable resources – often high-value, low-volume contraband such as diamonds, opium, or cocaine – as crucial stimulants and supports for violent internal conflict. Since these resources are found in delimited areas of the national territory, globalization also reinforces the territorial character of the conflict. Without access to a world market and specifically the trading networks that permit such products to reach that market, the resource base for many internal conflicts would wither. The diasporas described by Lyons

are another resource that globalization provides to insurgent movements. Overall, globalization may tilt local balances of power against weak central governments and in favor of peripheral insurgencies.

Territorial regimes in an era of globalization

Territorial regimes – territoriality defined as institutions – reflect the territorial attachments and stakes of key actors and also shape those definitions of territoriality. Two contributions, by Kal Raustiala (chapter 9) and Beth Simmons (chapter 10), provide a final reading of the complex relationships among territoriality, globalization, and conflict. Each concentrates on one of the dimensions of territorial regimes. Raustiala examines changes in jurisdictional congruence; Simmons re-evaluates border delimitation.

The pre-1914 era of globalization witnessed a normative consolidation of what is often labeled the Westphalian territorial regime – two centuries after the Peace of Westphalia – as well as its incorporation into state practice. Although the nineteenth century had produced experiments in federal and decentralized governance in Europe, in its final decades a diverse realm of “federative politics” had been replaced by the centralized nation-state (Binkley 1941). This transformation affected both dimensions of the territorial regime. On the one hand, boundaries came to be formally delimited in the contemporary sense. As Peter Sahlins describes in his history of the border region between France and Spain, the Treaty of the Pyrenees, which “inaugurated the first official boundary in the modern sense” in 1659, was only the starting point in a process of border delimitation.¹⁶ The construction of a more precise boundary regime was only completed in the Treaties of Bayonne in 1866 and 1868. Over two centuries, both national elites and local communities contributed to the social and political demarcation of the boundary between the two societies (P. Sahlins 1989).

At the same time, throughout Europe and other parts of the world, jurisdictional congruence – exclusive political control across policy realms within the delimited boundaries – became the norm for the first time. This was perhaps most important in the realm of identity, which lay at the core of the emerging nation-state. As Charles Maier (2000) describes, identity space and decision space were now closer to coincidence. This coincidence was reflected in a growing national and international aversion to dual nationality – that each individual should have one nationality and only one – a norm that was consolidated in bilateral treaties, such as the Bancroft treaties signed by the United States and in a 1930 League of Nations convention (Koslowski 2001, 205–07).

Mercenaries, once commonplace parts of national military forces, also began to give way to citizen armies during the nineteenth century (Avant 2000).

In central economic policy domains, a similar process of delimitation and assertion of exclusive jurisdiction also took hold during the late nineteenth century. Territorial currencies grew in importance, after centuries in which several currencies – public and private – had typically circulated within national borders. The strengthening of exclusive territorial currencies was closely linked to the building of the national territorial state, through policing of national tender laws, extension of state control over currencies that were accepted by state offices, and the use of currencies as significant national symbols. The process was driven by technological capability, in particular the ability to produce standardized currencies, as well as the reduction in transaction costs that a common currency implied (Gilbert and Helleiner 1999). As in other dimensions of the new national jurisdictions, territorial currencies only triumphed in the mid-twentieth century. Before 1914, alternative models, such as currency unions and free banking, remained potent challengers (Helleiner 2003).

Somewhat paradoxically, given the claims that are often made regarding the territorial effects of globalization, these shifts toward the consolidated territorial nation-state took place during decades of growing international economic integration. That earlier era of globalization figures prominently in the contribution of Kal Raustiala to this volume. In his examination of extraterritoriality (jurisdictional claims beyond territorial boundaries), he discovers that the era of globalization in the nineteenth century marked a movement in American constitutional jurisprudence toward strict territoriality (as defined above). This territorial principle applied to American citizens and to the citizens of other “civilized” states. Toward weaker, non-European states during this era of imperialism, globalization encouraged extraterritoriality, extending the jurisdictions of powerful states beyond their borders in order to protect their citizens and favor their firms. In some cases, the extraterritorial regime was governed by a set of unequal treaties (as in the case of China); in others, the extension of jurisdiction implied rule in a more complete sense – imperialism (Binkley 1941, 165–68).

From a legal regime founded on jurisdictional congruence in the late nineteenth century, the United States has moved to a more heterogeneous territorial regime in the early twenty-first century. In certain respects, the mixed legal regime of the United States described by Raustiala tracked the evolving international territorial regime. The legal regime of delimited borders and jurisdictional congruence that emerged

in Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries spread around the world after 1945. The post-1945 territorial regime incorporated elements of the earlier period and at the same time modified those constituents under the influence of decolonization. Given the military and political weakness of many of the new states, an even more rigid attachment to territorial rules, norms, and practices that established clear borders and ensured national government control within those borders became a central aim of political elites. Technological advance and resource claims have also driven border delimitation, a trend that culminated in the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS established maritime Exclusive Economic Zones for the first time, a substantial extension of qualified territoriality into the oceans.

At the same time, contemporary territoriality also demonstrates change in several key dimensions that may be explained in part by globalization. Although precise border delimitation has been retained and even expanded, congruence of policy jurisdictions with the national territorial domain has eroded, in what John Ruggie terms “the unbundling of territoriality” (1993, 165). This process of reducing the congruence of policy domains with territorial limits has been driven by globalization. The revival of interest in regional currency unions (with Europe’s EMU as the most prominent example) or the “borrowing” of another government’s policy regime (in the form of dollarization) are only two examples from economic policy. Increased cross-border migration has put pressure on the demographic boundary regime, producing a reversal in international norms against dual citizenship (Koslowski 2001). Overall, in Maier’s terms, identity space coincides less with decision space.

Raustiala notes a parallel development in American jurisprudence, which has extended the reach of both American regulatory law and, for citizens at least, the spatial scope of the Constitution. Extraterritoriality – claims by the state that its legal reach exceeds its territorial jurisdiction – has grown in American jurisprudence since 1945. Globalization provides incentives for governments presiding over increasingly integrated economies to expand their regulatory regimes. These extraterritorial claims have become less constrained as confidence has grown that peace among the advanced industrialized countries will persist. In this respect and others, however, Raustiala argues that conflict has been as important as globalization in shaping the territorial regime in US law. The constitutional rights of US citizens are now confirmed regardless of their physical location, the result of jurisprudence confronting the realities of Cold War military deployments. Territoriality has been

maintained in the case of aliens, resident and non-resident, as security threats posed by more open borders have become more salient (Raustiala, this volume). The heterogeneous – some would say incoherent – legal regime that has emerged from this complex of international change suggests a patchwork in which the previous territorial regime of strict jurisdictional congruence has been overturned, but no new alternative has replaced it.

Territoriality may incorporate a different balance between globalization and conflict in the future, an alteration that will be reflected in changed domestic legal regimes. If globalization and international attachment to human rights increase, regimes of harmonization that reduce the disparity between national jurisdictions and international practice may take shape. On the other hand, in a future filled with higher perceptions of external threat, the line between citizen and non-citizen may be sharpened once again, although without a reinstatement of old-style jurisdictional congruence.

Although both contemporary globalization and international conflict may have contributed to regime change on the dimension of jurisdictional congruence, both eras of globalization have been marked by continued and perhaps growing attachment to a well-defined border regime. This observation seems to undermine claims that globalization has rendered borders *less* important, at least for economic exchange. Beth Simmons resolves this apparent paradox by treating international borders as institutions. As such, agreed borders provide valuable benefits to neighboring states in the form of increased certainty and reduced transaction costs. Simmons demonstrates the opportunity costs that countries bear when their borders are disputed, even when those disputes are not militarized. Those costs, measured in terms of bilateral trade forgone, are in many cases substantial. Good borders make good traders. Globalization, by increasing the prospective gains that may result from settled borders, offers incentives for a well-bordered world (Simmons, this volume).

The apparent effects of globalization on the territorial regime in the contemporary era differ significantly from its effects before 1914. Three possible explanations can be advanced for this puzzle. First, as Lake and O'Mahony argue, the effects of globalization before 1914 may have been swamped by other trends – technological and institutional – that created strong incentives for an increase in state size through territorial expansion. Certainly, the persistence of a strong regime of border delimitation in both eras (whatever the economic significance of those borders) is explained in large measure by technological advance. Second,

globalization itself may have changed in character. An agent-centered view of globalization's effects emphasizes changes in the sectoral character of foreign investment. Foreign investors in the earlier era of globalization insisted on territorial control to guarantee their economic stakes; after 1945, new forms of investment changed the territorial program of economic agents (Kahler 1984). Finally, although more powerful states have a wider array of options for expanding their jurisdictional reach, the territorial regime influences their choices. The norm against territorial conquest, for example, has strengthened since 1945, despite persistent claims of extraterritorial jurisdiction (Zacher 2001).

Globalization, conflict, and changes in territoriality

Despite differing methodological approaches and concentration on different dimensions of territoriality, each contributor to this volume rejects a simple causal path from globalization to deterritorialization to reduced conflict. Globalization does not produce a world in which territorial attachments of individuals and groups, territorial stakes claimed by governments, or the territorial regimes constructed by states have been consistently devalued. Although changes in territoriality are apparent, much of that change can be attributed to sources other than economic globalization.

Territorial attachments remain profound in much of the globalized world – and not only, as Newman emphasizes, on its least globalized margins. Conflict may exercise a more significant influence on the attachment of populations and elites to territorial focal principles for defining themselves and their homelands, as Goemans argues. As Robbins claims, economic globalization may figure in territorial detachment only as a vague aspiration for the future, and religious globalization may offer a sounder basis for an uncomfortable divorce from a long-standing spatial identity. Globalization and even national policies may fail to penetrate the powerful local processes of border formation and territorial claims described by Newman. By increasing ease of communication and economic transfers, globalization may permit diasporic attachments to old and often unseen homelands to flourish, hardening territorial claims and propagating territorial conflict.

Changes in the frequency of violent territorial conflict among states may also owe less to globalization than has often been argued. Lake and O'Mahony note the influence of globalization on the decreasing size of states in the twentieth century (although not in the earlier, pre-1914 era

of globalization). Even so, the rise of unitary democracies plays an equally important role in the relative decline of territorial stakes in interstate conflict. Gartzke assigns economic development a more significant and unambiguous role than globalization in the decline of territorial disputes and warfare. Buhaug and Gleditsch find little evidence that warfare demonstrates the same “death of distance” that some have found for economic transactions in a globalized world.

Territorial regimes have changed substantially over the past century, but once again, globalization is only one of the sources of change. Extraterritoriality, measured by Raustiala in the evolution of American constitutional jurisprudence, has both domestic and international sources. Globalized states with greater regulatory scope have been more tempted to expand their extraterritorial jurisdiction *if* the risk of military conflict is low. The pressures exerted by globalization for an erosion of jurisdictional congruence are therefore qualified by both domestic and international variables. At the same time a different globalization – the growing reach of the US military during the Cold War and new cross-border threats in the post-Cold War era – has also moved the spatial dimensions of the American legal regime. Paradoxically, globalization serves to confirm another dimension of the territorial regime that emerged in the nineteenth century: more precise border delimitation. Simmons offers persuasive evidence that settled borders provide substantial benefits in an era of growing cross-border economic exchange. However, other trends – technological and political – have also propelled governments in the same direction, as noted by Peter Sahlins and other historians.

Rather than endorsing a simple and popular notion that globalization has produced a borderless world, one in which territoriality has declined in significance and conflict over territorial stakes is rare, the authors in this volume offer a more complicated causal story, one in which globalization’s effects on territoriality have differed over time and have been highly conditioned by and sometimes outweighed by other variables. International and internal conflicts have both reflected changes in territoriality and induced change in territorial attachments, stakes, and regimes. Globalization has encountered obstacles since the late 1990s: the Asian financial crisis, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the end of the stock market bubble in the United States, and the SARS epidemic. There is little evidence, however, that the integration of the world economy has gone into reverse. Understanding the often uneasy cohabitation of globalization with an evolving territoriality will remain central both to our understanding of international politics and to the alleviation of violent conflict.

NOTES

The author thanks Kelly Wurtz for his research assistance. Jonathan Kirshner and members of the Olin Institute Economics and National Security Seminar at Harvard University offered helpful comments on an earlier version of this chapter.

- 1 For an example from the field of anthropology, see Donnan and Wilson 1999; in history, Burnett 2000 and P. Sahlins 1989.
- 2 This research project, co-directed by Barbara Walter (University of California, San Diego), is supported by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The authors represented in this volume are drawn from the disciplines of anthropology, law, political science, and geography.
- 3 For a survey of research on unit variation, see Kahler 2002.
- 4 Acharya is describing the mandala system of O. W. Wolters, the galactic polity of Stanley Tambiah, and the theatre state of Clifford Geertz.
- 5 The logic underlying this definition of globalization follows closely Kahler and Lake 2003a.
- 6 For a comparison of pre-1914 globalization and contemporary globalization, see Kahler and Lake 2003a.
- 7 R. Cohen 1997, ix. Compare to Shain and Barth 2003, 452.
- 8 The preceding findings regarding territorial conflict are drawn from Huth 1996, Huth 2000, Hensel 2000, Hensel 2002, Vasquez 2004, Vasquez and Henehan 2004, and Walter 2003.
- 9 On the divisibility of stakes and war, see Fearon 1995.
- 10 Russett and Oneal 2001; Morrow 1999 for a skeptical view.
- 11 Gartzke, this volume. On the value of economic integration in facilitating costly signaling, see Gartzke and Li 2003.
- 12 Although territorial MIDs (Militarized Interstate Disputes) have declined as a proportion of MIDs in recent decades, they find a slight increase in the proportion of territorial wars over the same period (Buhaug and Gleditsch, this volume).
- 13 On the growing importance of internal conflicts relative to interstate conflicts, see Eriksson and Wallensteen 2004; Sarkees et al. 2003.
- 14 Fearon and Laitin (2003, 77) counter the conventional wisdom that the outbreak of civil wars has increased since the end of the Cold War. Instead, the apparent increase results from their failure to end.
- 15 The importance of existing administrative boundaries as focal principles for new state formation is confirmed in Goemans, this volume.
- 16 The quotation is from Kratochwil 1986, 33.

